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Finding the Baoding Villages:
Reviewing Chinese Conceptualisation of 
Sino–African Agricultural Cooperation  
Philip H. P. Liu 
Abstract: Scholars usually examine African images of the Chinese to 
understand African responses to Chinese economic expansion, yet they 
rarely observe that a constructed image of Africa has been built up in 
China. That image is intrinsically racist and promotes the idea that Chi-
nese investment can somehow “rescue” Africans from their “laziness.” 
This paper analyses the enduring legend of the Baoding villages, con-
structed to persuade the Chinese public that Chinese farmers could easily 
make their fortunes and win respect in Africa. A review of the history of 
Sino–African agricultural cooperation reveals that this fabricated narra-
tive was convincing because it reinforced Chinese perceptions of African 
inferiority and reproduced existing ideologies of foreign aid and propa-
ganda concerning policy effectiveness.  
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Introduction 
Racism has long underpinned the provision of foreign aid. William East-
erly argued that the West exchanged its old racist language for a new 
rhetoric of foreign aid: “uncivilised” became “underdeveloped,” and 
“savage people” became “the Third World” (2007: 24). According to 
Andy Baker (2015), white Americans see black foreigners as lacking in 
human agency, and thus in need of foreign aid. Paulette Goudge con-
tended that helping the Third World poor is actually “exacerbating the 
situation by replicating white-on-black power relations” (Goudge 2003: 
23). Perceptions of aid recipients can be manipulated by the power rela-
tions of aid providers; for example, Jeffrey Sachs (2006: 207) showed 
that many people have used racist stereotypes of Africans to explain the 
failure of aid programmes.  
Depictions of the uneven power relations between blacks and 
whites may also promote aid provision. For example, images of misery in 
which Africans are portrayed as nameless, passive victims usually elicit 
compassion from Westerners (Bleiker and Kay 2007). Reinforcing the 
stereotype of African backwardness may assist fundraising, but it has 
been criticised as an extension of colonialism (Manzo 2006). Postcoloni-
alists emphasise the colonial distinction drawn between “us” and “the 
other,” which leads to the psychological construct of “the giver as super-
ior and the receiver as inferior” (Goldfinger 2006). 
Historically, the Han people adopted an attitude of discrimination 
towards “barbarian” groups that had not accepted Chinese culture (Ma 
2014: 8), in which white-skinned barbarians were considered slightly 
superior to their dark-skinned counterparts because the latter were be-
lieved to eat raw food. In the seventeenth century, mainly through Ma-
cau, China became more familiar with the slavery system and African 
slaves sometimes fled to China. This knowledge of the slave trade con-
firmed the low status of Africans in the Chinese world view, with black 
Africans becoming more engrained as a symbolic expression of slavery. 
Therefore, in addition to “black barbarians” (heiyi), Chinese (mostly Can-
tonese) also called Africans “black slaves” (heinu), “devil slaves” (guinu), 
and “barbarian devils” (fangui) (Liu 2013: 132–134). 
In the nineteenth century, conflicts between China and Europe 
made China abandon its initial impression of Europeans as barbaric. 
While China began to learn from European culture, there was no socio-
economic force to improve the Chinese perspective of Africans. Even 
worse, Chinese scholars were influenced by Social Darwinism and rein-
forced racist portrayals of Africans as inferior (Dikotter 1992).  
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In the mid-twentieth century, racial equality and anti-colonialism 
emerged as founding principles of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
and Beijing tried to realise these principles by providing aid to Africa. 
However, racial conflict occurred on university campuses in China dur-
ing the 1960s and 1980s on the grounds that Africans were thought to be 
wasting Chinese aid (Sautman 1994; Liu 2013). Therefore, the Sino–
African relationship, like Western–African relations, may have been 
publicly perceived as consisting of a giver and a receiver.  
China’s support for Africa today is a complex mix of aid and in-
vestment; the bilateral relationship is no longer that of giver and receiver. 
However, Cheng Yinghong argued that the word “Africa” is inseparable 
from “aid” for ordinary Chinese, who still understand China’s provision 
of aid as gift-giving rather than a complex investment strategy. There-
fore, racial prejudice against Africans persists. Noting that the Chinese 
are sensitive to Western racist attitudes but blind to their own racism, 
Cheng called such racial ignorance “racism with Chinese characteristics.” 
He further argued that Chinese perceptions of black Africans have been 
racialised to perpetuate the negative image of Africans as “the primitive 
and inferior other” (Cheng 2011).  
Cheng’s claims have been supported by recent field research. Tang 
Xiaoyang of Tsinghua University confirmed empirically that most Chi-
nese entrepreneurs in Africa believe that Africans are very lazy (Tang 
2014: 266). Howard French conducted first-hand interviews with Chi-
nese in Africa, and found that many Chinese hold racist views of Afri-
cans but still hope to make a profit from and migrate to Africa (French 
2015). Contrary to our general understanding, although Africa is attract-
ing Chinese investment, Chinese investors do not seem to perceive Afri-
cans positively.  
Many researchers have used African images of Chinese to investi-
gate the influence of Chinese economic expansion, with diverse results 
(Sautman and Yan 2009; Fijalkowski 2013; Hess and Aidoo 2015). How-
ever, research on Chinese images of Africans has been limited. As do 
many in the West, many Chinese racially stereotype Africans. If  the West 
has used discourses of  an “inferior other” to establish a powerful “us” 
that justifies their provision of  aid to Africa, has China similarly repre-
sented Africans as primitive and inferior to support its current foreign 
policy, which combines aid with investment? How have negative images 
of Africans been manipulated to vindicate Chinese economic expansion? 
A case study is used to answer these questions.  
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The Baoding Villages 
Liu Jianjun’s Undying Legend 
The term “Baoding villages” became famous several years ago, when Liu 
Jianjun, formerly a local government official in the city of Baoding, re-
ported that he had been helping farmers migrate to Africa since 2005, 
and had established settlements for Chinese farmers known as Baoding 
villages. After a 30-minute talk broadcasted on China Central Television 
(CCTV) in January 2007, during which he explained how easily these 
farmers had made their fortunes in Africa, Liu was interviewed by nu-
merous Chinese and Western media outlets. He claimed that in 1996, 
some Chinese from Baoding had accidentally discovered the fertility of 
Zambia’s land and quickly made their fortunes by growing food in Zam-
bia. Within a short time, Liu explained, these Chinese farmers had ex-
tended their agribusiness activities to 28 African countries. They formed 
settlements called Baoding villages, each with 400 to 2,000 residents, on 
more than 1,000 square kilometres of leased land.  
Liu claimed that although Africa’s land is fertile, the African people 
are “a little bit lazy, happier to pick fruit from trees than to grow it them-
selves” (Coonan 2008). On the grounds that Africans’ farming skills have 
been atrophied by laziness, he argued that exporting Chinese farmers to 
Africa would both solve the continent’s food problems and enable Chi-
nese farmers to make their fortunes. He said that with the extension of 
the Baoding villages, farmers of Côte d’Ivoire were so grateful that they 
awarded Liu the honorific title of “Chief” (qiuzhang in Chinese, referring 
to the head of a primitive tribe). He then used Côte d’Ivoire to represent 
the whole of Africa, called himself “African Great Chief” (Feizhou da 
qiuzhang), and his kente-cloth cloak was the proof. A photograph of Liu 
dressed as an “African chief” was widely circulated in the Western media 
(see Figure 1).  
Liu’s story is regarded as true by most journalists and some scholars 
(Brunn 2011: 1258; Nyíri 2010: 108). However, from 2007 to 2009, Chi-
nese netizens mounted an investigative campaign called “Baoding villages: 
Where are you?” in 15 African countries alleged to host the villages, and 
failed to find them. At approximately the same time, several Sino–African 
specialists interviewed Liu Jianjun on the matter and even searched physi-
cally for Baoding villages in Zambia. They concluded that the number of 
Chinese farmers in Africa had been greatly exaggerated (Yan and Saut-
man 2010: 328; Bräutigam 2009: 266–269).  
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Figure 1. Liu Jianjun Dressed as an “African Chief” 
Source: Coonan 2008. 
However, Chinese media outlets continued to interview Liu Jianjun and 
broadcast his stories of Chinese success in Africa. For example, two 
articles on Liu’s experiences appeared in 2012 in the PRC Ministry of 
Culture’s monthly publication. The abovementioned photograph of Liu 
dressed as an African chief was used on the cover, and the articles con-
firmed that Liu had drawn domestic and international attention by “help-
ing tens of thousands of Chinese farmers, entrepreneurs and businesses 
to settle down in Africa” (Wen and Li 2012). In 2013 in another maga-
zine, published by Jiansu Province’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the 
Baoding villages were reported to have made so much money for Chi-
nese in Africa that the settlements had become “villages of Chinese 
bosses” (Bi 2013). Due to the ongoing fascination with Liu’s story, Deb-
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orah Bräutigam called the Baoding villages a legend that, “like a zombie, 
[…] refused to lie down and die” (Bräutigam 2015: 73–74).  
Chinese God of Agriculture 
In general, Chinese perceptions of African villages are very negative: 
many high-ranking Chinese officials, even President Xi Jinping, have 
repeatedly cited African villages as an undesirable model of Chinese 
development (Luo et al. 2016). It can thus be inferred that the persistent 
legend of prosperous Chinese villages in Africa not only serves the gov-
ernment’s ideological agenda but explains China’s agricultural coopera-
tion with Africa. The aim of this paper is not to determine whether the 
story of the Baoding villages is true or false, but to ask why this story has 
survived for so long in China.  
In addition to the photograph of himself dressed as an African 
chief, well known in the West, Liu disseminated a picture via Chinese 
media to encourage the Chinese to invest in Africa. The latter photo-
graph shows an African peasant surrounded by other locals, and one of 
them seemed to be kowtowing to Liu (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Liu Jianjun’s “Proof” of African Begging for Agricultural  
Assistance
Source: Tang 2013. 
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[The photograph shows] a friendly African brother wearing cere-
monial dress: his red garment represents the sun, his black pants 
represent his race and his yellow boots represent the earth. He 
knelt and gave his land title to the Chinese. Under the supervision 
of Côte d’Ivoire’s defence minister Kedakuaxi, he solemnly pro-
claimed, “My ancestors, please forgive me. I did not manage your 
land well. Now I ask the Chinese to cultivate the land. Please bless 
them.” (Jing 2008; Tang 2013)1 
This account would make it seem as if Liu made reference to a ritual of 
reverence to divine figures, which was just mentioned as “kowtowing.” 
Liu Jianjun reported raising his left hand and replying in the man’s own 
language, which he derogatorily referred to as the “local tribe speak” 
(dangdi tuyu), as follows: “You are all my children. I will help your land to 
grow bananas, other types of food, and gold” (Jing 2008; Tang 2013).2  
In short, the photograph shows Africans begging the Chinese to 
provide agricultural aid. Kowtowing while wearing ceremonial dress is 
usually part of a religious ritual. Noting that the colours of the chief’s 
clothes represented the sun, the land, and the “African race,” Liu ex-
plained that black Africans have such admiration for Chinese farming 
skills that the Chinese are regarded as equivalent to gods of agriculture. 
The Chinese god of agriculture (Shennong or the Yan Emperor) is so 
important to Chinese culture that the Han people usually regard them-
selves as descendants of Shennong (yanhuan zisun). Shennong is believed 
to have invented cultivation 5,000 years ago, enabling the Chinese – 
formerly cultureless barbarians – to adopt sedentary farming and gradu-
ally develop the Chinese civilisation.  
This God–human relationship must have been so convincing that 
many Chinese media outlets were interested in Liu’s agricultural success. 
Thus, the legend of the Baoding villages could be based on blatant ra-
cism that drew on existing Chinese perceptions of African cultural infer-
1 Translated by the author. The original Chinese reads, “Shanliang de Feizhou 
xiongdi chuan zhe zhuanyong de yifu—shangyi hongse daibiao yangguang , yao xia heise 
daibiao zhongzu, xi xia tu huangse daibiao tudi—guixia lai ba tudi zhengjiao gei Zhong-
guoren. Zai Ketediwaguo fangbu zhang Kedakuaxi de zhuchi xia, zhuangyan dihan: ‘zu xian, 
qing ni yuanliang wo, ni liu gei women de tudi, women meiyou guan hao, xianzai qing 
Zhongguoren lai bangzhu gengzuo, qing nin baoyou tamen.’” See Liu Jianjun’s website: 
<http://fzliujianjun.blog.163.com/album/#m=2&aid=218470159&pid=674948
4298> (12 July 2017). “Côte d’Ivoire’s defence minister Kedakuaxi” may refer 
to Moise Lida Kouassi, the minister of state for defence and civil protection.  
2 Translated by the author. “Growing gold” refers to getting rich from the agri-
cultural products. The original Chinese reads, “Nimen dou shi wo de haizi, wo yao 
rang nimen de tudi zhangchu liangshi, zhangchu xiangjiao, zhangchu jinzi.” 
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iority. As Liu Jianjun, born in 1945, was a local government official for 
many years, his understanding of African agriculture was probably based 
on official propaganda and civilian impressions of Sino–African agricul-
tural cooperation since the establishment of the PRC. He disseminated 
his experiences in Africa in the form of photographs and anecdotes and 
received a very positive response from the public. Determining how Liu 
constructed the Baoding villages legend, and how the public accepted it, 
requires attention to materials on Sino–African agricultural aid and in-
vestment distributed to the public since the 1960s.  
Early Chinese Agricultural Aid 
Mao Era
During the Mao era, due to strong anti-colonialism, black skin signified 
revolution and progressiveness rather than inferiority. Numerous items 
of propaganda such as photographs and paintings were disseminated to 
convey Africans’ strength, bravery, and friendship with the Chinese. The 
term “African/black brothers” was widely used in the Chinese media, 
and Mao personally praised “African black brothers” for helping China 
to rejoin the United Nations (Deng 2008: 232). These historical repre-
sentations of Sino–African brotherhood were the origin of Liu Jianjun’s 
reference to “a friendly African brother.”  
The strength of commitment to the Sino–African brotherhood was 
evidenced by eight key principles of foreign aid announced by Premier 
Zhou Enlai in 1964. These principles emphasised “mutual benefit” and 
the obligation to help recipients of aid to “increase their income and 
accumulate capital” (Larkin 1973: 105).3 The term “mutual benefit” indi-
cated that China would be content with enhancing its political reputation 
while Africa unilaterally enjoyed economic benefits. Anti-colonialist and 
related concerns about African economic development were so strong 
that most Chinese diplomats criticised the West for taking away Africa’s 
agricultural raw materials (Guo 2006: 73). 
In line with these fervent expressions of altruism, the main objec-
tive of China’s provision of agricultural aid was to increase grain produc-
tion in Africa, removing the need for Africans to sell raw materials over-
seas in exchange for food. In most cases, the introduction of Chinese 
3 The original English can be seen on the PRC Foreign Ministry’s website: 
<www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18
001.shtml> (15 July 2017). 
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intensive farming methods to Africa rapidly increased food supply, and 
African politicians praised the agricultural changes brought about by 
Chinese technicians. Proverbs such as “Give a man a fish and you feed 
him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime” were 
frequently used to describe the Chinese contribution to African agriculture.  
Compared with the sedate approval of politicians, African farmers 
reacted more dynamically to China’s involvement in Africa. Singing and 
dancing to express happiness was common. Records also show that the 
Chinese contribution was so widely recognised that during war, techni-
cians who did not speak the local language had only to say “Kibimba,” 
the name of a Chinese rice scheme in Uganda, to be allowed to pass by 
the militia. In some cases, Africans so highly esteemed Chinese tech-
niques that they “gave the honorific title ‘Chief’ to Chinese technicians” 
(Waijiaobu dangdai Zhongguo shijie waijiao shenya bianji weiyuanhui 
1995a: 109). Even more strikingly, some farmers expressed appreciation 
by “kneeling on the ground for a long time […] with tears in their eyes 
[…] calling the Chinese technicians ‘saviours’” (Wang 1999: 200; Wai-
jiaobu dangdai Zhongguo shijie waijiao shenya bianji weiyuanhui 1995b: 
46, 1995c: 394).  
These powerful scenes of African appreciation indicated the success 
of China’s agricultural aid and revolutionary enthusiasm. However, agri-
cultural development usually declined soon after the Chinese technicians 
left, for which an explanation was needed. Although the aid records 
provide no examples of harsh complaints, Chinese technicians generally 
believed that the agricultural opportunities created by the fertility of 
African land were wasted by lazy Africans. However, they were aware 
that criticising African laziness might incur punishment, as it violated 
ideological principles and orders from the top. Hua Guofeng warned 
Chinese technicians that they “should not complain about African lazi-
ness and filthiness, but regard Africans progressively” (Jiang 2013: 46). 
Hua Guofeng proved that many Chinese, even during the revolu-
tionary era, still held negative opinions of black Africans, but were not 
allowed to express these opinions for ideological reasons. Criticism of 
black African laziness was thus expressed carefully, in statements such as 
“Africans admire Chinese diligence” or “the Chinese have helped Afri-
cans to understand their land’s fertility and productivity” (Waijiaobu 
dangdai Zhongguo shijie waijiao shenya bianji weiyuanhui 1995c: 96, 
218). African land was described as so fertile that even a walking stick 
could rapidly take root, enabling Africans simply to pick up food from 
the ground; this was used to explain the difficulty experienced by the 
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Chinese in teaching Africans to grow rice (Waijiaobu dangdai Zhongguo 
shijie waijiao shenya bianji weiyuanhui 1995b: 205, 147–148).  
In this era, perceptions of black African backwardness were under-
stood to result from colonialism; therefore, black Africans were posi-
tioned as China’s revolutionary comrades in need of aid. To prove the 
effectiveness of China’s aid provision, African demonstrations of appre-
ciation, both official and civilian, were publicised. However, the sheer 
extent of African gratitude for Chinese agricultural aid, conveyed by 
kneeling on the ground and conferring the honorific title of “Chief,” for 
example, reinforced Chinese perceptions of black African incompetence. 
Africa’s naturally fertile land and easy access to food were used to ex-
plain this incompetence. Some of these records may have inspired Liu 
Jianjun to fabricate the legend of the Baoding villages.  
Post-Mao Era 
After the Chinese government launched economic reforms in the early 
1980s, capitalism and the West were no longer treated as hostile, and 
China was no longer revolutionary. Ideological change reduced polit-
icians’ eagerness to promote foreign aid. For example, Deng Xiaoping 
complained that so much aid had been provided for China’s allies that 
many recipients had become excessively dependent on China. This ex-
plains the decrease in the proportion of the national budget allocated to 
foreign aid between 1973 (7.2 per cent) and 1981 (0.6 per cent) (Yang 
and Chen 2010: 49–51). Once regarded as China’s revolutionary broth-
ers, the recipients of aid had become a financial burden. 
As the pursuit of market-oriented self-development became an in-
creasing priority in China, the government had to develop a new foreign-
aid strategy. In 1983 Premier Zhao Ziyang announced new principles of 
“economic and technical cooperation” with Africa, again referring to 
“mutual benefit.” However, as these were no longer foreign-aid prin-
ciples, the terms “cooperation” and “mutual benefit” implied that China 
would only help African countries to “increase their income and accu-
mulate capital” in return for economic benefits.  
Existing aid units were transformed into benefits-seeking units. For 
example, for ideological reasons, the Chinese government had previously 
criticised the exportation of African agricultural raw materials to the 
West; however, such exportation was an integral part of the post-Reform 
mutual-benefit policy. A former Chinese ambassador to Zaire (now the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo) proudly recalled converting con-
struction units used in former aid projects as part of the new policy. The 
Chinese government actively invested in a factory left by Westerners to 
 Finding the Baoding Villages 101 
enable China to profit from exploiting forestland and exporting wood 
from Zaire (Waijiaobu dangdai Zhongguo shijie waijiao shenya bianji 
weiyuanhui 1995b: 205, 189–193).  
China was no longer willing to provide aid without a profit. Much 
of its “cooperation” with African countries in the 1980s was based on 
existing projects. Bräutigam cited many cases in which Africans were 
portrayed as incapable of managing Chinese projects, and explained that 
the Chinese government thus began to offer technical support for com-
pleted projects in the early 1980s, to help African countries “build self-
reliance.” During this cooperation, China explored “the links between 
aid and investment” to enable new Chinese corporations to obtain “ex-
periences and maybe profits.” Privatisation was also implemented to 
“resuscitate failed projects, restoring them to life and health” (Bräutigam 
2009: 56–62).  
To present the previous altruistic strategy as ineffective and the new 
strategy – privatisation and the involvement of profit-oriented Chinese 
corporations – as the best means of helping Africa, the African inability 
to manage Chinese projects had to be emphasised. In the 1980s, ex-
amples of failing aid projects rejuvenated by the Chinese were circulated 
widely among the Chinese public. For example, in 1988, praising the 
effectiveness of Zhao Ziyang’s principles of foreign aid, a journalist 
writing for the People’s Daily reported that after the Chinese handed over 
a tannery project to Mali, the factory soon became “hopeless” (buke 
jiuyao). When Chinese technicians returned to the factory, it rapidly ex-
perienced huge growth. Similarly, the TAZARA Railway was reported to 
have suffered a financial loss as soon as it was transferred from Chinese 
to African management in 1976. However, after Chinese technicians 
joined the management team in 1983, the railway’s prospects improved; 
by 1987, China had received a net profit of USD 27 million from the 
railway (Ming 1988). 
All of these Chinese success stories conveyed the clear message that 
black Africans’ management skills were weak and even “hopeless.” In 
the era of economic reform, when China’s government began to learn 
from the West, black skin lost its resonance as a revolutionary symbol. 
As a result, reports of Chinese success reinforced existing perceptions in 
China of black African inferiority. Public information on black Africans’ 
poor management of Chinese projects possibly encouraged racial riots 
against African students that occurred on university campuses during the 
1980s. In addition to accusing Africans of backwardness and laziness, 
Chinese students complained that Africa was wasting Chinese aid (John-
son 2007: 44–50; Sautman 1994; Sullivan 1994).  
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Before the 1980s, due to ideological concerns and an emphasis on 
Sino–African comradeship, Chinese technicians were not allowed to 
criticise black Africans for their agricultural failings. However, in the 
post-Reform era, when capitalist methods of helping Africa were being 
explored, depictions of African weakness were increasingly used to 
demonstrate the strength of the new foreign-aid policy. The Chinese 
were now freer to express their views on black African inferiority to 
prove the superiority of Chinese management. Technicians involved in 
the above-mentioned Kibimba Rice Scheme offered reports similar to 
stories of Chinese success during the 1980s.  
The Kibimba Rice Scheme, established during the 1970s, was de-
signed to be a turn-key aid project. It was handed over to Uganda in 
1982, but in the meantime the goal of Chinese aid policy had changed to 
one of seeking profit. The Chinese government assumed, albeit without 
clear proof of Ugandan incapability, that the country lacked effective 
managers, and in 1983 took over the management of the scheme once 
again. In a paper published in 1986 in the academic journal of the Minis-
try of Commerce of the PRC, a technician involved in the rice scheme 
praised Chinese achievement, reporting that the rice farms had collec-
tively become a profit-making corporation because their management 
was predominantly Chinese. The technician concluded that Chinese 
management was the best way to “revitalise old Chinese aid projects” 
(Gui 1986). The Chinese technicians working on the scheme went home 
in 1989. In 1991, however, several technicians were sent back to help the 
Ugandan managers, as the farm was in decline. One of these technicians 
reported that the Kibimba Rice Scheme had suffered serious losses be-
fore the Chinese technicians left in 1989 (Ma 1992).  
The rice scheme was not really “old” when its management was 
transferred from Uganda to China. It was not “revitalised” in the 1980s, 
and the Chinese managers were not better than their Ugandan counter-
parts. However, Chinese foreign aid was being remodelled as a new form 
of cooperation, and African incompetence had to be emphasised to 
support the new policy.  
As illustrated by the Kibimba Rice Scheme, the image of “poor 
management” in Africa has repeatedly been fabricated or exaggerated to 
meet Chinese needs. As the Chinese government wanted to bring the 
rice project under Chinese management, perceptions of African inferior-
ity were revived and Ugandans were again presented as incapable. The 
same narrative can be extended to Sino–African economic cooperation 
overall in the post-Mao era. The image of Africa was restructured to 
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present Africans as inferior rather than revolutionary, demonstrating the 
effectiveness of China’s new mutual-benefit policy.  
Appearance of Agricultural Gods 
Gods in the Sino–Zambia Friendship Farm 
According to Liu Jianjun, the Baoding villages were constructed in Zam-
bia in 1996. Therefore, it is vital to trace Chinese agricultural cooperation 
with Zambia since 1996 to understand the development of the Baoding 
legend. It should be mentioned in advance that since 1995 Beijing has 
officially encouraged its agencies and commercial entities to closely 
combine foreign aid with investment and other profit-oriented activities 
(Sun 2014).  
In the early 1990s, to help Zambia “increase its food supply and job 
opportunities” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2014), Beijing decid-
ed to provide not only aid but private investment, enabling the Chinese 
to enjoy full management of an agricultural project for the first time. 
Using low-interest loans, the Chinese government invested USD 300,000 
in a state enterprise to build a “Sino–Zambia Friendship Farm” (Yun 
2000: 309). 
The concept of Chinese gods of agriculture in Africa emerged with 
the construction of the Sino–Zambia Friendship Farm, the first Beijing-
sponsored and Chinese-owned agricultural project in Africa. In 1997 a 
paper entitled “Chinese Gods of Agriculture” (Zhongguo shennong) was 
published in the journal of the PRC’s Ministry of Agriculture (Hu 1997). 
It stated that this farm, though medium-sized, was the most efficient 
among 2,000 foreign-invested farms and performed better than many of 
those run by white men. The Chinese had ensured good harvests and 
made a profit of USD 1 million in the previous six years, and were thus 
honoured as agricultural gods by the locals.4  
In its role as an agent of God’s mercy, the Chinese government rec-
ognised that in addition to making money and surpassing Western pro-
jects in Africa, China must be presented as helping Africa. Accordingly, 
in 2001, a paper also entitled “Chinese Gods of Agriculture” was pub-
lished in the Ministry of Agriculture’s journal (Li and Wang 2001). Al-
4 This paper did not define Chinese efficiency, but Deborah Bräutigam conduct-
ed field research in Zambia and Beijing and concluded that the Sino-Zambia 
Friendship Farm struggled to be profitable. She also pointed out that the Chi-
nese press tended to exaggerate the performance of Chinese farms (Bräutigam 
2015: 109–110).  
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though the focus of this paper was the Sino–Zambia Friendship Farm, 
the successes of this Chinese-owned farm were implicitly extended to 
China’s overall engagement with Africa. In addition to praising Chinese 
management skills and profit-making, the author argued that China’s 
agricultural gods had been able to achieve so much due to Africa’s lack 
of development and its ongoing food shortage.  
As the performance of this pilot project satisfied Beijing, helping 
Africa by selling food to Africans gradually became the core incentive of 
Sino–African agricultural cooperation. In 2002 China’s then deputy min-
ister of foreign trade and economic cooperation, who was in charge of 
foreign aid, said, “Sino-African agricultural cooperation in the new cen-
tury must be conducted by enterprises and should be market-oriented” 
(Ju 2002). The deputy agricultural minister, Han Changfu, also described 
the investment of Chinese agribusinesses in Africa as a “win-win” form 
of cooperation, because China’s agricultural successes helped to solve 
Africa’s food problems (Ju 2002).  
The Chinese model of win-win cooperation links aid with profit-
oriented activities, and thus altruism with capitalism. Based on these two 
different and even contradictory ideologies, the interpretation of Chinese 
projects has become situational. Although the primary purpose of Chi-
na’s involvement in Africa is to make a profit, Africa must also be shown 
to benefit, thereby demonstrating the success of the mutual-benefit pol-
icy in the twenty-first century. Therefore, such investment is usually 
presented as selfless aid for Africa. Although the government’s method 
of helping Africa has changed, the public has been given no reason to 
change its perception of Africans as inferior.  
Chinese Humanitarianism 
As an illustration of Sino–African agricultural cooperation in the twenty-
first century, the Sino–Zambia Friendship Farm has attracted political 
attention. Li Ruihuan, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference, visited the farm in 2003, further increasing its national 
recognition. The People’s Daily published an article on Li’s visit entitled 
“Chinese Must Give a Good Demonstration” (Zhongguoren yao zuohao 
shifan) (Liu 2003). The term “demonstration” had previously been used 
in aid contexts to describe Chinese technicians’ exposition of agricultural 
techniques to African farmers, but was now used to describe a profit-
oriented venture.  
Chinese often fail to distinguish between African peoples. There-
fore, the author of the People’s Daily article used the term “black people” 
(heiren) rather than “Zambians” to describe the Zambian locals. Accord-
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ing to the article, the proficient management and financial expertise of 
the Chinese had enabled the farm to hire 96 “black people,” each of 
whom enjoyed a USD 22–26 monthly salary and welfare benefits such as 
insurance. Most importantly, Zambian locals were able to learn skills 
from the Chinese. Li Ruihuan also praised the farm for selling food to 
increase the local food supply, which he described as “a noble act of 
poverty alleviation and humanitarianism” (fupin jikun de rendao zhuyi de 
gaoshang xingwei).  
In the People’s Daily article, Zambians’ gratitude for China’s contri-
bution was represented similarly to its pre-1980s manifestation: many 
locals in traditional dress sang and danced to welcome Li. Li also in-
structed the farm technicians to teach Chinese cultivation skills to the 
locals, because Zambia already had fertile land and perfect weather. The 
message was clear: Zambians welcomed the introduction of Chinese 
farming skills. Furthermore, Li’s account of the visit reinforced the Chi-
nese belief that black Africans are incapable of managing their fertile 
land. 
Again, to justify the Chinese policy, black Africans had to be por-
trayed as inferior. Although China has invested in agriculture in Austral-
ia, the People’s Daily neither uses the term “demonstration” to refer to 
their agribusinesses in Australia nor boasts that Australians have learned 
techniques from Chinese. The Chinese government does not emphasise 
its provision of insurance for Australian employees, because this is a legal 
obligation for employers in Australia; and Chinese officials definitely do 
not call their agribusiness in Australia a noble and humanitarian act. 
The concept of Chinese “agricultural gods” was a response to images 
of African backwardness. As Africans were perceived to be unable to 
feed themselves, agribusiness was understood as a continuation of Chi-
na’s former altruism in Africa. As a result, Li Ruihuan and the People’s 
Daily journalist quoted above interpreted China’s investment precisely as 
humanitarian work in Africa. According to this logic, the African benefi-
ciaries of China’s investment were those who worked for Chinese corpor-
ations (providing employment opportunities, poverty relief, and skills 
development), and those who bought Chinese products (increasing local 
food supply). Therefore, Chinese profit-making was construed as aid 
provision, eliciting gratitude and adulation from the African people.  
Overall, representations of the Chinese as agricultural gods and de-
pictions of African adulation resembling those of the Mao era (locals 
singing, dancing, kneeling, and calling the Chinese saviours) have been 
used to demonstrate the success of China’s post-Reform policy in Africa. 
Africans were once represented as gratefully welcoming China’s non-
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profit aid; they now worship the Chinese for their agribusiness. Chinese 
propaganda not only presents the government’s policy as effective, but 
implies that shrewd Chinese investors enjoy both profits and respect in 
Africa. This is also the essence of Liu Jianjun’s propaganda.  
Chinese Angel Farmer 
Influential Chinese in Africa 
Liu Jianjun began to propagate the story of the Baoding villages in 2005, 
and became nationally and internationally famous after his CCTV inter-
view in January 2007. Therefore, media reports regarding Sino–African 
agricultural cooperation during this period deserve special attention, as 
they directly contributed to public understanding of Africa and the ac-
ceptance and dissemination of the Baoding legend. The most positive 
representation of Sino–African cooperation was the story of Li Li, which 
supported Li Ruihuan’s account of China’s “noble act of humanitarian-
ism” in Africa.  
In November 2006, just before Liu’s CCTV interview, when the 
world’s attention was focused on the third Ministerial Conference of the 
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, Li Li, the female head of another 
Chinese farm in Zambia, Jonken Farm, gained national recognition as 
the most highly ranked in the government’s list of “Ten Chinese Who 
Deeply Moved the African People” (gandong Feizhou de shiwei Zhongguoren). 
Due to the scope of Chinese propaganda on Li Li’s contribution to Afri-
can society, she has been discussed in several Western studies (Bräutigam 
2009: 254; Michel and Beuret 2009: 18). How did Li Li move the African 
people?  
Li Li was first noticed by the public on 7 November 2004, when a 
40-minute interview with Wang Chi, Li Li’s husband and the head of 
Jonken Farm, was aired on Phoenix Television in its “Eternal China-
town” (tang ren jie) slot. Li played a supporting role in the interview. She 
had been a nurse in Beijing with no farming experience before joining 
her husband to run Jonken Farm. Wang Chi described the farm’s em-
ployees as follows:  
Black people’s (heiren) spiritual quality of life is better than that of 
Chinese, because they do not worry […] unless they get hungry, 
black people generally do not worry about making a living. Black 
people have many failings, such as being irresponsible and bad at 
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management […] many of them have petty-theft convictions and 
stick to the farm like lice (shizi).5 
Wang Chi was killed in a car accident in 2005, and Li Li took over his 
position. In June 2006, the People’s Daily published a moving story, circu-
lated among African locals in Zambia, about a widow who successfully 
managed a farm worth USD 5 million. Major themes addressed in this 
story were the farm’s 200 employees and 20 per cent share of Lusaka’s 
market. Many other impressive achievements were reported in the ar-
ticle. Seven thousand locals had worked on the farm since 1994. Workers 
learned professional skills such as management. Over its history, the 
farm had accommodated 4,000 families, ensured that 14,000 were well 
fed and clothed (wenbao), and paid USD 45,000 to cover employees’ pen-
sions and insurance. As a result, Li Li won great respect from her em-
ployees (Huang 2006). 
In December 2006, after Li Li received her award from the gov-
ernment, the People’s Daily published her story again, newly entitled 
“Thousands of Africans Saved by [Li Li].” The article revealed that the 
farm had received USD 600,000 from the government’s “foreign-aid 
fund” (yuanwai zhuanxiang jijin). This explains why Li Li’s achievements 
were so highly praised in the official media: like the Sino–Zambia 
Friendship Farm, Jonken Farm represented a combination of aid and 
investment, and provided further proof of the effectiveness of China’s 
Africa policy.  
In addition to writing about the farm’s large market share and its 
supporting numerous Zambian employees, the People’s Daily journalist 
mentioned that Li Li had paid USD 150,000 in interest to a Zambian 
bank (which had loaned her USD 1.3 million). Due to these contribu-
tions to Zambian society, the locals called Li Li an “angel” (tianshi) and 
by extension felt great respect for China (Song 2006).  
However, the impressive statistics and accounts of Zambian adula-
tion deserve closer attention. Zambia has a very reasonable welfare law 
for labourers, which requires employers to provide insurance and ac-
5 Translated by the author. The original Chinese reads, “Zheli heiren de jingshen 
shenghuo de zhiliang yuan bi Zhongguoren de pubian jingshen shenghuo zhiliang yao gao, 
yinwei tamen meiyou youlu […] duzi e zhi qian heirenmen yiban bu tai weisheng huo 
fachou. Suoyi heiren you hen duo quedian, baokuo dui gongzuo de bufuze renhuo bu shanjing 
yingdengdeng […] hen duo shihou shouxia de yixie yuangong hen xiang jisheng zai 
nongchang zhe yangda qi yeshang de shizi, duoshao youdian xiaotou xiaomo de xingwei.” 
The title of this interview is “Zambiya muge” (Zambian Pastoral). The whole in-
terview text can be seen at <http://yangzh101.blog.sohu.com/236761462.html> 
(14 July 2018). 
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commodation. The law is so favourable to Zambian labourers that it has 
been described by the US Department of State as “extremely generous” 
(US Department of State 2013). To reduce the cost of welfare, Li Li 
limited the size of the farm’s regular workforce, which explains why only 
USD 45,000 had been paid to cover employees’ pensions and insurance 
since 1994. Most workers were hired only in busy seasons. Although this 
is simple, cost-effective behaviour, it is also worth noting that part-time 
workers (7,000) and their family members (14,000) were counted toward 
Jonken Farm’s social contribution to underscore the success of Sino–
African cooperation.  
Chinese investment activities in the West that conform to local la-
bour laws by supporting employees’ welfare are never presented as char-
ity. However, as black Zambians/black people were publicly perceived as 
lazy, irresponsible, poor managers and habitual thieves, everything pro-
vided by China could be portrayed as a contribution. Even Li Li’s repay-
ment of interest on loans (USD 15,000) was considered to help Africa.  
When Investment Becomes Aid 
Li Li was interviewed by numerous Chinese media outlets, and journal-
ists at a popular magazine, Southern Weekly, visited her farm in 2010. 
Again, the farm’s share of the local market, locals’ laziness and theft, the 
diligence of Chinese workers, and China’s contribution to Zambia were 
reported. In addition, the article misrepresented the profit-oriented farm 
as part of China’s official agricultural-aid scheme, and the farm’s Chinese 
managers as official technicians (Zhang 2010).  
The extent of the farm’s profit orientation was represented confus-
ingly in the Chinese media, as Chinese aid is usually intertwined with 
investment. Even Chinese scholars are confused by China’s aid strategy 
(Zhang, Yuan, and Kong 2010). Nevertheless, this strategy has received 
considerable support from academics, including Western scholars 
(Woods 2008). Citing his own experience in Mali, Professor Li Anshan 
of Peking University argued for the effectiveness of the Chinese policy as 
follows:  
This sugar factory was a Chinese aid project, but suffered losses 
after transferring to Mali. It is a joint venture now […] and has 
improved the local economy […] a European colleague said that 
aid is aid, business is business, so why are the two combined? In 
fact, any project that benefits local society is a good project. The 
traditional Western model of aid provision for Africa encountered 
challenges and became inactive. However, since China combined 
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aid and investment in the 1990s, many projects have been revital-
ised. (Ning 2010)6  
Combining aid and investment improves development efficiency and 
allows investment to be represented as aid in official propaganda. From 
the perspective of the Chinese public, Africans keep receiving gifts from 
China, and thus maintain their inferior status. As indicated by the Chi-
nese ambassador to Tanzania, Lu Youqing, when Chinese smugglers are 
caught by African customs officials, they do not express guilt but com-
plain about the waste of China’s generous aid to Africa – despite the 
limited nature of such aid (Ning 2014).  
Although Li Anshan praised the Chinese strategy of combining aid 
and investment, he also criticised the official stance on China–Africa 
relations: “Official publicity materials always position China as an altruis-
tic donor, which is not true, and Africans also have a bad feeling about 
it” (Center for African Studies, Peking University 2012). This claim was 
supported by a complaint made by Sudan’s ambassador to China that 
Chinese investment activities in Sudan are misrepresented as foreign aid 
(Zhou 2013: 164). 
Africans have a “bad feeling” about China’s aid because beneficiar-
ies are usually expected to pay respect to aid providers. Although the 
current business-oriented model of Sino–African cooperation is more 
equal than the previous aid relationship, China tends to be identified as 
the giver – with a higher status than Africa – in the Chinese media. 
Therefore, it is not easy to correct Chinese perceptions of African infer-
iority. As long as Sino–African economic cooperation interlinks aid with 
investment, the Chinese public will continue to believe that Chinese 
businesspeople making profits in Africa are providing aid on the conti-
nent.  
Overall, the story of the “angel of Zambia” echoes previous repre-
sentations of the Chinese as “agricultural gods.” China’s private business 
activities in Africa are represented to the Chinese public as official aid. 
Chinese discourses emphasise the superior management skills and dili-
gent working attitude of the Chinese, which are presented as guarantee-
6 Translated by the author. The original Chinese reads, “Zhe yuanben shi Zhongguo 
yuanzhu de xiangmu, danjian chengjiao gei Mali yunying houyi zhi kuisun, yushi xianzai 
chengwei hezi qiye […] tongxing de yiwei Ouzhou xuezhe hen yihuo, shuo yuanzhu jiushi 
yuanzhu, shangye hangwei jiushi shangye hangwei, weishime yao hunza qilai ne? Shishi 
shang, bu luncai qushi me fangshi, zhiyao shidang di shouyi jiushi hao shiqing. Xifang 
chuantong de yuanfei moshi shiji shangmian lin kunjing, quefa huoli, er Zhongguo zi shang 
shiji 90 niandai kaishi ba yuanzhu he touzi jiehe zhihou, dada diji huo le xiangguan 
xiangmu.” 
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ing Chinese success and African adulation on the continent. All of these 
themes are evident in the legend of the Baoding villages.  
Others Responsible for the Baoding Villages 
Myth
If the fable of the Baoding villages arose from the Chinese people’s gen-
eral understanding of Sino–African agricultural cooperation, it must have 
been propagated by individuals other than Liu Jianjun. For example, in 
2007, the author of a book on investment in Africa published by the 
PRC National Audit Office wrote that  
God has given Africans an environment in which it is easy to sur-
vive, resulting in black people’s persistent indolence […] a com-
mon Chinese farmer in Africa can become an expert, and a com-
mon [Chinese] technician in Africa can become a professor. (Jian 
2007: 25)7  
Government officials may hold similar opinions. Bräutigam observed 
that soon after the legend of the Baoding villages emerged, Li Ruogu, 
president of the Export–Import Bank of China, recommended that mil-
lions of unemployed Sichuan farmers start up agribusinesses in Africa 
and become landlords overseas. Bräutigam also noted that in 2009, the 
renowned agricultural scientist and National People’s Congress delegate 
Zhao Zhihai proposed mobilising one million unemployed Chinese to 
solve the African food shortage (Bräutigam 2015: 56–74). Bräutigam 
found this proposal perplexing, but the rhetoric used by Zhao to per-
suade farmers to move overseas was not unfamiliar to the Chinese: “Our 
farmers are hard-working […] and will all become agricultural techni-
cians in Africa” (Liu 2009). 
Academics also provided support for the Baoding villages policy. 
Using the same logic as Zhao Zhihai, the Shanghai Information Center 
published an article entitled “Exporting Farmers to Africa,” in which 
such exportation was described as a novel win-win policy (Shanghai 
Information Center 2009). In a 2008 paper in the Ministry of Com-
merce’s journal, a new strategy for combining aid and investment was 
detailed: Chinese should be sent to run agribusinesses in Africa, on the 
7 Translated by the author. The original Chinese reads, “Shangdi fuyu le Feizhou ruci 
youyue de shengcun huanjing, cai zaocheng le heiren kuangri chijiu de duoxing […]. 
Zhongguo putong nongmin dao le Feizhou jiuke chengwei zhuanjia, yiban de jishu renyuan 
lai dao Feizhou ze ke chengwei jiaoshou.” 
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grounds that Chinese farmers are more proficient than their African 
counterparts. “Food production requires intensive cultivation and exten-
sive labour, which Africans cannot achieve” (Wang 2008: 38). 
The belief that Africans are too lazy to produce food may also have 
been accepted by aid technicians. At the 2006 Forum on China–Africa 
Cooperation, the Chinese government promised to “send 100 senior 
experts on agricultural technologies to Africa” (Forum on China–Africa 
Cooperation 2006). One of these experts was Geng Naili, a hydraulic 
engineer from Xi’an, who was stationed in Côte d’Ivoire from 2009 to 
2010. He recommended that 160,000–320,000 Chinese farmers be sent 
to Africa to support African agriculture. Another of the 100 technicians, 
Hao Feng from Chongqing, was stationed in Tanzania. Hao wholeheart-
edly accepted Geng’s idea and encouraged Geng to submit an academic 
paper to South China Agriculture, of which Hao was the chief editor. 
Although the paper was not officially published, Geng made it public on 
the Internet. He also told netizens that Africa’s land is fertile and its 
people lazy, enabling any Chinese farmer to become a technician and 
make a fortune on the African continent.8  
Conclusion 
Clearly, Liu Jianjun is not alone. He is supported by civil servants, aca-
demics, and government officials who believe that Chinese can help lazy 
Africans by making money from them. This attitude arose from the close 
connection between foreign aid and investment. As China’s foreign-aid 
policy in Africa combines altruism and capitalism, it can be interpreted as 
aid and/or investment. Using the rhetoric of altruism, capitalism, and 
racism, Chinese investment in Africa has been presented as a humanitar-
ian act.  
Liu Jianjun’s compelling interpretation of China’s foreign-aid strate-
gy in Africa explains why the legend of the Baoding villages survived for 
so long. He successfully merged public information, ideologies, and 
policies regarding Sino–African agricultural aid and investment from the 
past to the present, creating a narrative in which the Chinese had for 
8 The original exchange between these overseas agricultural specialists was previ-
ously available for public viewing on an online forum run by the Ministry for 
Agriculture of the PRC <www.cicos.agri.gov.cn/Forums/ShowPost.aspx?Post 
ID=778>, but has since been removed. However, Geng’s major arguments still 
can be found on other websites: <http://bbs1.people.com.cn/postDetail.do? 
id=97677921&boardId=1>; <http://ido.3mt.com.cn/Article/201001/show1 
818704c32p1.html> (6 November 2017).  
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decades made money and won respect in Africa. This was consistent 
with long-held beliefs in China. Contrary to scholarly consensus, there-
fore, the Baoding villages do exist. They are not in Africa, but in China – 
more specifically, they reside in the minds of the Chinese.  
For the last 50 years, the provision of aid has been central to Chi-
na’s policies in Africa. During the revolutionary era, the admiration of 
African farmers for Chinese aid was widely propagated. Today, the focus 
is African farmers’ admiration for Chinese agribusiness. This change of 
emphasis indicates that the Chinese conceptualisation of agricultural aid 
in Africa has evolved with policy and ideological changes. African infer-
iority was once cited as a reason to provide aid; it is now an incentive to 
invest, enabling the Chinese to distinguish themselves on the African 
continent. 
Last but not least, Liu Jianjun told the author in a 2016 interview 
that he was no longer building Baoding villages. After explaining Admiral 
Zheng He’s link with Africa, Liu told me that he is now promoting 
“Zheng He” villages, whose inhabitants help Africa in the form of light 
industry, not agriculture. Liu clearly revised his legend to fit the narrative 
of the maritime Silk Road, part of Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road Initiative” 
(BRI) development strategy. A People’s Daily correspondent in June 2017 
argued that Liu’s Baoding village is in essence the same as the BRI (Wei 
2017). In May 2018, the reputable Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kun Pao 
reported that Liu would extend his African career based on the BRI (Ta 
Kun Pao 2018). As Chinese foreign policy evolves, a new interpretation of 
China’s strategy to help Africa is likely to emerge in the near future and 
might be a suitable topic for research to come.  
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Auf der Spur der Baoding-Dörfer: Eine kritische Analyse  
chinesischer Perzeptionen von chinesisch-afrikanischer  
landwirtschaftlicher Kooperation 
 
Zusammenfassung: In der Regel untersuchen Wissenschaftler die 
Wahrnehmung Chinas aus afrikanischer Perspektive, um afrikanische 
Reaktionen auf die chinesische Wirtschaftsexpansion zu verstehen. Da-
bei wird häufig übersehen, dass in rassistisches Bild von Afrika konstru-
iert wurde, welches die Vorstellung fördert, chinesische Investitionen 
könnten die Afrikaner vor ihrer „Faulheit retten“. Dieser Artikel analy-
siert die sich hartnäckig haltende Legende um die Baoding-Dörfer, die 
die chinesische Öffentlichkeit davon überzeugen soll, dass chinesische 
Bauern in Afrika leicht ihr Glück machen und Anerkennung finden kön-
nen. Ein Blick auf die Geschichte der chinesisch-afrikanischen landwirt-
schaftlichen Kooperation zeigt, dass dieses Narrativ Anklang fand, weil 
es die chinesische Wahrnehmung der afrikanischen Minderwertigkeit 
bestärkte und bestehende Propaganda und Ideologie im Bezug auf aus-
ländischer Hilfe und politische Effektivität reproduzierte. 
 
Schlagwörter: Afrika, China, Baoding-Dörfer, chinesische Investitionen 
in Afrika, ausländische Hilfe, Liu Jianjun, chinesisch-afrikanische land-
wirtschaftliche Kooperation, Rassismus 
